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In the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
UT AH COOPERATIVE ASSOCIA-1\ 
TION, a Utah Cmporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
) 
WLBURN DALE HiELM and 
MARIE L. HELM, his wife, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
No. 10509 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF 
THE CASE 
This is an action for a Declaratory Judgment declar-
ing and determining the meaning of a lease between the 
plaintiff as lessee and the defendants as lessors, or in the 
alternative, a reformation of said lease. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Summary Judgment was granted upon the original 
complaint which sought an interpretation of the contract. 
Plaintiff then attempted to add a cause of action ,in refor-
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mation by way of amending his complaint. The plaintiff's 
Motions to set aside the Summary Judgment, foT permis-
sion to file an amended complaint, and for an Order re-
quiring the plaintiff to make deposits in court pendente lite 
were denied. From the Summary Judgment and denial of 
the plaintiff's Motions, the plaintiff appeals. 
REI.JEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-Respondent seeks an affirmanoe of the lower 
court's Summary Judgment, with denial of leave to amend; 
and respondent seeks a dismissal of the action with preju-
dice. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent agrees with and adopts the statement of 
facts recited by appellant. 
POINf NO. I 
THE COURT WAS CORRECT IN GRANTING DE-
FENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AND FOR REFUSING TO SET ASIDE SAID SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT FDR THE REASON THAT AS A MATTER 
OF LAW THE PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO RE-
LIEF ~UGHT. 
This is clearly an attempt to escape the consequences 
of a lease agreement by manufacturing a cause for breach. 
The plaintiff, Utah CoopeTative Association, made a bar-
gain which turned out to be unsatisfactory to them. The 
lease agreement was drafted by the appellant, Utah Coop-
erative Association. The lease agreement is nine ( 9) legal 
sized pages of technical language. It attempts to protect 
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the appellant from most imaginable disagreeaible si.tuatiOlnS 
which might be encountered and for which the appellant 
might desire relief. It is clear that the contract is an inte-
grated document and is intended to be the total embodi-
ment of all agreements between the parties. Appellant 
now asserts that paragraph 7 of the lease entitled the plain-
tiff to the termination of its obligati()lllS, and they rely on 
the sentence in this paragraph which states "It is under-
stood and agreed that if by reason of any law, ordinance, 
or regulation of properly constituted authority, or by in-
junction, Lessee is prevented from using all or any sUJb-
stantial or material part of the property herein leased as 
a service station for the sale and storage of gasoline and 
petroleum products, or if the use of the premises as a ser-
vice station shall be in any subsbw.tiaJ or material manner 
restrict.ed, or should any governmental authority refuse at 
any time during the term or extension of this lease to grant 
such permits as may be necessary for the installation of 
reasonable equipment and operation of said premises as a 
service station, then the Lessee may, at its option, surren-
der and cancel its lease, remove its improvements and 
equipment from said property, and be relieved from the 
payment of rent or any other obligation as of the date of 
said surrender." (Emphasis added.) 
(1) It is the respondent's position in this brief that 
this language is clear upon its face and that this clearly 
entitles the respondent to Summary Judgment. It neces-
sarily also follows that if the language is clear, then there 
could be no material facts which could vary the terms of 
the agreement. The Parol Evidence rule would bar any 
conflicting affidavits or testimony. This is a matter so 
LI. 
fundamental that extensive discussion is unnecessary. See 
Selection&ion Williston on- Contracts (Revised Edition) Sec. 
639,· p. 509. 
That general rule is further supported by the facts of 
this case. · The appellant drafted this contract which it now 
claims is "manifestly unconcionable". It was executed on 
May 5, 1961, and for three years, until 1965, the Appellant 
claimed the benefits and privileges of the lease without 
complaint and without claim that it had erred in its pro-
visions.. It· does not complain today that a provision was 
actually ·left out in the dTafting or reduction to writing of 
the agreement. It is merely complaining that it does not 
like the court's interpretation of the lease and that this is 
a "mistake" wlhich entitles it to reformation. 
To support its position, the appellant has emphasized 
the phrase starting with "or if the use of the premises as 
a service station shall be ·in any substantial or material 
manner restricted" as a basis for rescission, but the appel-
lant neglects the frst part of the sentence which starts "It 
is understood and agreed that if by reason of any law, or-
dinance or regulation of properly constituted authO'rity, or 
by injunction . . . " The ordinary rules of English usage 
require that the first of the sentence elaiborates and ex-
plains, and limits the use of the term "restricted" as used 
in the appellant's argument. Thus, the import of the sen-
tence is that a governmental regulation must be the limit-
ing· restriction. Even without reading this parenthetioal 
phrase which certainly clarifies the intent of the sentence, 
the· use of the word "restriction" itself couldn't be conceiv-
ably stretched· in the English language to include the claim 
of the plaintiff. Restriction denotes "to confine, to keep 
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within limits", Webster's New World Dictionary of the 
American Language, College Edition, 1954, and connotes 
an interference. It would require an extreme twisting of 
the mother tongue to hold that the construction of a high-
\Vay restricts, and therefore interferes with, the use of 
property two miles away bounded on another highway, 
especially when the construction of the new highway was 
contemplated by the parties in determining the price of 
the lease. The use of the word in this manner would de-
stroy the value orf the English language as a means of so-
lidifying expectations by the use of contracts. 
To interpret the phrase "in any manner restricted" as 
the appellant does, would open a Pandora's box, since the 
reasons for business failure are as many and varied as the 
nwnerous businesses which fail every year. Poor man-
agement, disagreeable customer relations, excessive cut 
throat competition, inefficiency, lack of modern equipment, 
and just plain disinterest in the business can cause its fail-
use; but by such a humble phrase as that in question the 
plaintiff would have the Lessor be an insurer of the appel-
lant's business success and protect the appellant against 
its own inabilities. 
The appellant further asserts that at the least the 
contract is ambiguous. It claims that any contract is 
vague, ambiguous or uncertain if the paragraph "does not 
say the service station lease may not be terminated. if the 
highway construction greatly altered the flow of traffic 
away from the leased premises". 
It is repectfully submitted that this position is ridicu-
lous and untenable. To apply such a rule under the law 
of contracts would be to make every contract ambiguous, 
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uncertain or vague, and would flood the courts with liti-
gation A written memorandum would have no sanctity 
or binding power. Every contractual promise could be side-
stepped or parried by the legal threats that the contract 
didn't specifically provide for the particular unexp2cted or 
unmentioned contingency. It is respectfully submitted that 
no contract could ·be drafted which could provide for every 
contingency in a specific manner such as called for by the 
appellant. 
The appellant's approach was recognized and rejected 
in the case of Deseret National Bank vs. Dinwoodey, 17 
Utah 43, 53 Pac. 215 (1898). The is.sue in tht case was 
whether a guaranty contract was to cover past obligations 
as well as future, and the court required that this be stated 
in the contact and reJected the notion of ambiguity in the 
following language, at page 61: 
"Can any person say that there is a word in said 
instrwnent that makes the slightest reference, direc1ly 
or indirectly, to any past transaction? To do so, it 
seems to us, would be to entirely disregard ali rults of 
interpretation. We must therefore hold that, under 
the written instrument, the appellant was liable only 
for loans and advances made to the Burton-Gardner 
Company after the execution of the instrument, and 
not for pre-existing debts, in accordance with the 
terms of the contract." 
It ·is respectfully submitted that paragraph 7 of the 
lease is clear on its face and in no way can be construed 
to permit the relief that the plaintiff seeks. 
The appellant further asserts that the rule of Bullough 
vs~- Sims; 16 Utah 2d 304, 400 P2d 20, 1965, is applicable 
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to tlhe facts of this case. Respondent agrees fully with the 
rule of law there enunciated, but must respectfully point 
out to appellant that here there was no common under-
standing or a mutual course ()If action between the parties 
to vary the terms of the written agreement, and at no time 
has respondent done other than to abide by the very clear 
terms of the written agreement; and the respondent b8s 
L11Sisted that appellant do the same. 
Likewise, the respondent has no argument witll the 
holding in Bartell vs. Associated Dental Supply Company, 
114 C.A.2d 750, 251P2d16, (1952), where there was very 
obviously a drafting error in the lease. The appellant as-
serts that the facts of this case make it "sufficiently im-
portant not to resort to a guess as to what the lease means." 
It is respectfully submitted that ·in this case the hazards 
and uncertainty of a guess can he avoided by reading ·the 
iease agreement. 
POINT NO. II 
THE COURT WAS CORRECT IN DENYING PLAIN-
TIFF'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AN AMENDED 
COMPLAINT. 
The respondent agrees that the right to make amend-
ments in the ends of justice should be wholeheartedly and 
vigorously defended. Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure authorizes and provides for such an amendment. 
Respondent must also agree that the appellant has the right 
to file independent or alternate claims in setting forth· a 
c:ause orf action. It is the respondent's position, h01Wever, 
that the Judge did not abuse his discretion in denying ap-
pellant leave to file an amended complaint because the ap-
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pellant could not state a valid cause of action and could 
not validly reform the contract, and that, therefoTe, the 
interest of justice required a sp2ffly termination of these 
harrassment proceedings against the respondents, Wilburn 
Dale Hlelm, and Marie Helm. 
The appellant has asserted that by being permitted the 
right to seek an action for reformation that he coold state 
a valid claim. However, by this assertion, the appellant has 
put himself in a very tenuous position which has striking 
legal implications. In the first complaint filed by the appel-
lant, the appellant relied on the contract, asserting its va-
lidity and demanding that as a matter of law under the 
contract, the appellant was entitled to the relief sought. 
To buttress this claim for purposes of a summary judgment, 
the appellant filed the affidavit of Mr. Ervil Hansen, a rep-
resentative of the appellant Utah Cooperative Association, 
who said "that said terms were intended by the parties to 
provide Plaintiff, Utah Cooperative Association, with the 
right to terminate the lease upon the occurrence of facts re-
f erred to in paragraph 5 of said complaint." Thus, the 
appellant chose to rely on the contract and to rely on the 
interpretation of the contract. This is a matter of law 
for the court. 
It is readily conceded by the respondent that "reliance" 
by the appellant was doubtful at best and probably spur-
ious. But by filing their complaint and signing their affi-
davit, the representatives of the appellant chose to rely 
on the legal interpretation orf the contract. After the Court 
granted summary judgment in favor of the Respondent in 
this action, the Appellant suddenly discovered that it no 
longer wished to rely upon the contract and norw it asserts 
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that it may legally and validly base a claim for rescission. 
on its "mistake." It is respectfully submitted that although 
the appellant made what are alleged to l:>e alternative 
claims, it cannot correct an admitted position, taken by 
affidavit, by later pleading a totally inconsistent cause. 
'Dhus, it is submitted that the lower court did not abuse 
its discretion for the reason that the appellant could not 
state a valid cause of action in an action for reformation. 
There could be no fraud here where the appellant, after 
making the negotiations, drafted the contract. There is 
no assertion of a mistake of fact, no claim is made that a 
secretary left out a clause, a phrase~ or paragraph of the 
contract. All that is asserted is that the appellant does 
not like the court's inteTpretation 'Of the contract and that 
this was a "mistake." 
This is, at best, a mistake of law. It is respectfully 
submitted that such is not a basis upon which to grant a 
reformation of a contract where one of the parties did not 
like the court's interpretation of the contract. This would 
open up anotJher Pandora's box, and is the very basic heart 
of the rationale behind the Parol Evidence rule and the or-
dinary laws of contract intevpretation. To destroy this 
stronghold of certainty woold annihilate the business world, 
for no one could foresee and draft provisions for all oon-
tingencies. It would be a sad day when the contract would 
be for all practical purposes negotiated and drafted by liti-
gation. It is respectfully submitted that the Appellant's 
position logically must lead to this conclusion. 
The law applica:ble to this .situation has been amply 
discussed. in the ease of Deseret National Ba.Dk v. Din-... 
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woodey, cited above, and in the case of Andrus v. Blazzard, 
23 Utah 233, 63 Pac. 888. 
In the former case the plaintiff asserted that " [ t] his 
reformation is asked for on the ground of mutual mistake 
on the part of the plaintiff and defendants, (p. 46) ... " 
The Supreme Court rejected the mutuality, but held 
on page 60: 
"If there was any mistake in the execution, it was 
a mistake of law on the part of the bank, but such a 
mistake the law cannot relieve against. A mistake of 
law is an erroneous conclusion as to the legal effect 
of known facts, and it is laid down as a general rule, 
by a very large list of auhorities, that such a mistake, 
unconnected with a mistake of fact, and where there 
are no indications of fraud, imposition, Oi' undue ad-
vantage entering into the agreement, it will not be 
corrected by a court of equity. 2 Porn. Eq. Jur. Secs. 
842-847; 5 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 635; Hunt v. Rousa-
manier, 1Pei.1; Trigg v. Read, 43 Am. Dec. 447; Good-
enow v. Ewer, 16 Cal. 461; Stoors v. Barker, 10 Am. 
Dec. 316; Bank of U. S. v. Daniel, 12 Pei. 32; Loftus 
v. F°JSher, (Cal.) 39 Pac. 1065. 
We are clearly of the opinion, therefore, that re-
spondent is not entitled to have said written instru-
ment reformed, either upon the theory of mutual mis-
take in its execution, or mistake of law, there being 
no fraud or deception charged in the pleadings, or at-
tempted to be proven upon the trial, but that the par-
ties must stand upon the instrument as it appears upon 
its face and the rights accruing therefrom." 
This principle denying relief for a mistake of law was 
reaffirmed in the Andrus case. There the issue involved 
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the legal effect on a guardian of signing a note on behalf of 
his incompetent. The court said at page 254: 
"The guardian and beneficiaries of said note were 
fully aware of all the facts regarding the transaction; 
there was no mistake respecting the language of the 
note, but it was in the form and was executed in the 
manner intended. It is noit claimed that there was any 
fraud or mistake of fact in the transaction. The sub-
stance of resiponden's claim is that he and the bene-
ficiaries did not intend the note in legal effect should 
bind the guardian personally. 
When the facts are within the knowledge of both 
parties to a written contract, and the language. used is 
such as they intended, a mistake as to the legal effect 
of the contract or that its legal effect is different from 
that intended, is not available as a defense at law, and 
is not ground for a reformation of the contract in a 
court of equity, and can not be shown by parol." 
The oourt thereafte'r cited many authorities elaborat-
ing the 1reasons for the rule. 
For the present case before this Court, it is submitted 
that this rule is directly in point and is compelling. The 
trial court had before it, not only the motion to amend, but 
also the facts and affidavits of the amended complaint. It 
would appear without unnecessary elaboration that the ap-
pellant could not state a cause of action after it had made 
its claim in the first complaint. 
The trial court was not oblivious to this and also rec-
ognized the added hardship which the appellant seeks to 
impose by extending the litigation and withholding the pay-
ments from the respor.dent in order to wage the war on the 
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principle of economic submission. The court acted wisely 
and justly in its summary decision. 
POINT NO. III 
THERE IS NO NEED TO PAY THE DISPUTED 
LEASE MONEY INTO COURT PENDING DISPOSITION 
OF THIS MATTER. 
'rhe appellant bases its claim for the right to pay the 
lease money into court upon the theory that it legally would 
not be entitled to recover the money if it failed in its ac-
tion. 
It is submitted that this has no application to the facts 
presented here where the money is very obviously being 
paid under protest, and the Court could just as easily re-
quire repayment after decision without prejudice to the 
parties. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing principles, your petitioner 
requests that the Court find that appellant has no valid 
claim for relief and that his appeal be dismissed with pre-
judice. 
